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Today even the smallest organization depends heavily on information systems (IS) to 
support achievement of its objectives. Thus there exists a need for tools and techniques 
for choosing controls, or IS components that assure system dependability. Several 
researchers have developed quantitative models of controls. One such model for choosing 
controls incorporated the trade-off between the cost of establishing controls and the cost 
of not having them.  The model was a refinement of the "control evaluation table" 
method used by auditors, enhanced with a probability model of control effectiveness, and 
formulated as a 0-1 nonlinear optimization problem.  This paper presents a brief review 
of the model formulation and then goes on to provide a spreadsheet model solution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Controls are procedures built into an information system (IS) for the purpose of 
increasing its dependability. Decisions about what controls to incorporate into an IS are 
usually made during the design of the system. Walls (1992) formulated a 0-1 nonlinear 
optimization model for selecting the "right" set of controls for an IS (from a cost-benefit 
point of view). He found that to determine an optimal solution for the model required the 
use of a relatively obscure software package (MINOS) and nearly an hours worth of 
mainframe computing time. To avoid these issues, Walls and Turban (1992) implemented 
heuristics for finding good solutions in the form of logic programs in the Prolog 
programming language.  
Today’s powerful personal computers and sophisticated spreadsheet software 
provide tools for finding an optimal solution to the control selection problem that are 
readily available to everyone. This paper describes the use of a straightforward Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet model that employs the Solver© add-in to select a set of IS controls. 
CONTROL SELECTION MODEL 
Walls (1992) formulated a control selection model that was a refinement and 
extension of the control evaluation table method used by auditors to evaluate the 
collection of internal controls found in an IS.  The auditors’ method involved the use of a 
set of matrices containing a list of possible controls, the hazards each counteracted, and 
subjective assessments of the effectiveness of each control in counteracting each hazard.  
An example of a control is the use of a user name/password procedure to restrict access to 
information contained in an IS. Theft of confidential company data is an example of a 
hazard. 
The control selection model takes into account the tradeoff between the cost of 
including each control in the IS and the expected value of the financial impact of the 
hazards to which the system is exposed. The equation below reflects the total cost, TC, of 
a set of controls incorporated into an IS: 













i ZXEZRXC     
In this equation, Xi is a control, C(Xi) is the cost of control Xi, Zj is a hazard, R(Zj) is the 
economic risk associated with hazard Zj, and E(Xi,Zj) is the effectiveness of control Xi in 
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counteracting risk Zj. As may be seen from the above equation, adding controls to an IS 
increases total control cost (TCC) and decreases total residual risk (TRR).  Eventually, a 
point may be reached where the cost of adding control exceeds the savings due to risk 
reduction associated with including it.  Derivation of this equation as well as a discussion 
of other analytical models proposed for selecting and evaluating controls may be found in 
Walls (1992). (Ideas underlying the equation are also summarized in the Appendix.)  
To determine the best level of control, the above equation may be reformulated as 
an optimization problem. For any particular IS, there are many controls that could be 
implemented.  The problem was formulated as a 0-1 integer optimization problem with a 
nonlinear objective function.  This was accomplished by introducing a decision variable 
iX  which may assume a value of either 0 or 1.  If 0=iX  then the control iX  is not 
used.  If 1=iX  then the control is used.  The problem may be formulated as: 













1       
where 
 
iX  ε {0, 1} 




Note that in this formulation there is an important trade-off between control cost 
and effectiveness.  At one extreme, if all controls are implemented ( 1=iX  for all i), the 
total control cost will assume its maximum value and uncontrolled risk its minimum 
value.  At the other extreme, of no controls are implemented ( 0=iX  for all i) then the 
cost of using controls will be at its lowest level but the risk level will be at its maximum.  
Therefore, solving the above equation finds an appropriate balance between control cost 
and the level of risk.  This is done by using a common denominator (money) to relate 
control cost and risk. 
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Walls (1992) reported that finding an optimal solution to a design problem of 
realistic size took over forty three minutes of processor time running the MINOS 
nonlinear optimization package on an Amdahl mainframe. Today with powerful 
microprocessors and the Solver© add-in, solution times are dramatically reduced.  
A COMPUTATIONAL EXAMPLE 
This section presents a small example with five hazards, three consequences, and 
nine controls that illustrates the application of the model. The example is taken from a 






In this example, hazards listed in Table 1 were identified. Hazard opportunities and 
likelihoods for each were then identified and entered into the spreadsheet. For example, 
the likelihood of “Inaccurate payment input” is 0.025 (cell E6) and the opportunity for 
the hazard is 1,000 (cell E7) times per time period.  
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Table 1  
Hazards 
Inaccurate payment input 
Inappropriate payment processing 
Lost customer file 
Unsupportable billing statement 
Open access to A/R record 
 
The consequences listed below were also identified. One consequence of 
“Inaccurate payment input” is “Customer never billed”. As may be seen in the 
spreadsheet, the likelihood of this consequence is 0.99 (cell E9) and, if it were to occur, 




Customer never billed 
Revenue reported incorrectly 
Loss of resource 
 
Remaining parameters and calculation results may be found in the upper part of 
the spreadsheet of Figure 1. The lower portion of the figure lists nine controls (such as a 
“Turnaround billing document”) that could be used to counteract the hazards identified in 
Table 1. In the body of the figure (cells E15:I23) are the effectiveness of these controls. 
Row 24 shows the Net Effectiveness of this set of controls and row 25 the Residual Risk 
after this set of controls is applied.  
Note that the total cost of this control system is $6,636.30, which includes the cost 
of implementing all nine controls plus the Residual Risk remaining even when all 
controls are in place. 
Figure 2 is a restructuring of Figure 1 where variable names Z, Q, and X have 
replaced the descriptions of hazards, consequences and controls respectively. This 
spreadsheet is set up to take advantage of the Solver© add-in which supports the solution 
of optimization problems in the context of spreadsheet software (Winston and Albright, 
2004).  To accomplish this end, a set of 0-1 variables is introduced in column D to permit 
selection of particular controls to be brought into an optimal solution Furthermore, the 
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Net Effectiveness row has been modified to incorporate the 0-1 variables into the 
computation using expressions like   
=1-(1-E16*$D$16)*(1-E17*$D$17)*(1-E18*$D$18)*(1-E19*$D$19)* 
(1-E20*$D$20)*(1-E21*$D$21)*(1-E22*$D$22)*(1-E23*$D$23)*(1-E24*$D$24). 
Figure 2 shows an optimal solution where only controls X3, X4, X6 and X9 have 
been selected for a total cost of $4,929.68. This is a reduction of $1,706.62 or 26% 
compared to the cost of the system with all controls in place. Figure 3 is a screenshot of 
the Solver© dialog box showing minimization of TotalCost by changing 
SelectedControls subject to the constraint that SelectedControls is binary. Figure 4 is a 
screenshot of the Solver© options box showing the default settings indicating that the 
model is not linear. Although not included in this model, additional constraints could be 
added to indicate, for example, that certain controls must be used with other controls or 
that some controls are mutually exclusive (Walls and Turban, 1992).  
Figure 2 
Hazards Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5
Hazard Likelihood 0.025 0.135 0.029 0.240 0.280
Hazard Opportunity 1,000     1,000 200 1000 200
Consequence Potential Loss
Q1 20.00$            0.990 0.600 0.050 0.025 0.050
Q2 40.00$            0.050 0.050 0.050 0.200
Q3 200.00$          0.200 0.050 0.100
Total Uncontrolled Risk 11,126.40$     545.00$ 7,290.00$  75.40$ 2,040.00$  1,176.00$  
Control Control Cost
X1 500.00$          0 0.850
X2 500.00$          0 0.014
X3 500.00$          1 0.240 0.400
X4 500.00$          1 0.765 0.280
X5 500.00$          0 0.400 0.012 0.450 0.460
X6 500.00$          1 0.480 0.080 0.872
X7 500.00$          0 0.060 0.080 0.060
X8 500.00$          0 0.582 0.080 0.060
X9 500.00$          1 0.420 0.350 0.490 0.540 0.270
Net Effectiveness 0.946 0.742 0.490 0.941 0.270
Residual Risk 29.36$   1,883.27$  38.45$ 120.12$     858.48$     
Total Residual Risk 2,929.68$       
Total Control Cost 2,000.00$       




Order Processing Example - Control Selection
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Figure 3  
Screenshot of Solver© Dialog Box 
 
 
Figure 4  
Screenshot of Solver© Options Box 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This paper began with a reprise of prior research showing how design of 
information systems controls of interest to accounting and information systems people 
could be formulated as an optimization model that attempted to find an optimal solution 
to a problem of ongoing importance.  Because the computational effort involved in 
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solving this model can be very high due to the combinatorial nature of the model, earlier 
research resulted in heuristics that could considerably reduce this effort.  In this paper, the 
problem is formulated in such a way that an optimal solution can be determined using 
spreadsheet software. 
A numerical example was presented that includes five risks and nine controls.  In 
a realistic situation there will be many more risks and controls.  Since the model assumes 
hazards and controls are given in lists, there is no theoretical limit to the size of the 
problem that could be solved using this approach.  All one needs to do is add rows and 
columns to the spreadsheet corresponding to controls and hazards and data about loss, 
effectiveness, and cost.  There is a practical upper limit to problem size, however, 
because there is an upper limit to the number of variables and constraints that Solver© 
can accommodate in Excel.  
To simplify the model, all data was included in the cells of the spreadsheet. The 
model could be enhanced to obtain data interactively from the user.  Another possible 
extension would be to provide the user with tools such as the Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(Saaty, 1988) which can facilitate estimating risk levels and placing a monetary value on 
residual risk.  The user could also be permitted to review and/or override effectiveness 
measures.  Although the values used for costs and effectiveness measures in the example 
are arbitrary, expert opinions could be incorporated into the model.  
Although the intent of the model is to aid in the design of new IS, it could be 
modified to be used by auditors to evaluate controls in an existing system.  Application to 
an existing system would also allow one to fine tune it to make it more cost effective.  
The model can also be easily adopted to non-computerized systems.  After all, not all 
information systems are computer-based.  Such systems also have a need for cost-
effective controls. 
In order to generalize the implementation of this model the following research 
directions are recommended: (a) develop a methodology for quantifying the residual risk; 
(b) experiment with models of varying numbers of controls and risks to investigate 
practical upper limits on the size of model that can be solved with Excel; (c) develop a 
methodology for assessing the effectiveness of the various controls; (d) identify potential 
applications for the model; and (e) expand the model to deal with special situations. 
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In summary, the chief advantage of using a spreadsheet package to find an 
optimal solution to the problem of selecting IS controls is that such tools are widely 
available today and very familiar to business professionals.  Furthermore, the approach 
presented here can be implemented very quickly in any internal control system, assuming 
the availability of the necessary parameters.  One need only substitute in the existing 
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A hazard is an event likely to result in failure to meet a business objective. There 
are two parameters associated with each hazard: likelihood and opportunity. Hazard 
likelihood is the probability that a hazard will occur given an opportunity. For example, if 
one hundredth of one percent of all customer order transactions is lost, then hazard 
likelihood is 0.0001. The hazard opportunity is the number of times a processing task 
subject to a hazard is performed during a time interval. If ten thousand transactions are 
processed during a given period, then the hazard opportunity is ten thousand. To 
formalize these ideas, let Z = {Zj | j = 1,…,q} be a set of hazards associated with a 
business objective. The hazard opportunity for Zj is denoted T(Zj) and the hazard 
likelihood by A(Zj).  
A consequence is an outcome which may arise from any of several hazards and 
which may be assigned a monetary value. Multiple consequences may arise from a single 
hazard and multiple hazards may result in a single consequence. For example, loss of a 
customer order transaction (hazard) may result in a loss of the revenue arising from that 
order (consequence). To facilitate formal discussion of consequences, let Q be a set of 
consequences associated with the set Z: Q = {Qk | k = 1,…,r}. There are two parameters 
associated with a consequence: consequence likelihood and potential loss. Consequence 
likelihood M(Qk|Zj) is the conditional probability that a consequence, Qk, will occur 
given that the corresponding hazard, Zj, has occurred. For example, if when a customer 
order transaction is lost it results in loss of revenue forty percent of the time, then the 
conditional likelihood of lost revenue given a lost order is 0.4. The second parameter 
associated with a consequence is its potential loss, denoted by L(Qk), which is defined to 
be the monetary loss associated with a consequence.  
The uncontrolled risk, R, for a hazard Zj is the expected monetary loss associated 
with the occurrence of Zj if no controls are in place. It is calculated using the parameters 
of hazards and consequences: 
                                r 
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R(Zj) = A(Zj)T(Zj) Σ M(Qk|Zj)L(Qk)  
                              k=1 
 
CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS  
 
Let { }siXX i ,,1K==  be a set of s controls and { }qjZZ j ,...,1== be a 
set of q hazards.  We define the effectiveness, ( )ji ZXE , , of a control iX in 
counteracting a hazard jZ as the probability the iX will be successful in counteracting 
jZ .  This probability is designated as: 
 
( iXP succeeds with respect to )jZ . 
 
To understand the mathematics of combining controls, we will examine the 
interaction of two preventive controls that counteract the same hazard (Cushing, 1974).  
For convenience, we temporarily drop the notation related to the hazard, jZ , in the 
discussion below.  Let: 
 
( ) ( ii XPXS = succeeds with respect to )jZ and 
( ) ( ii XPXF = fails ) ( )iXS−=1 . 
 
Assume that two controls, iX  and kX , may counteract the same hazard.  The 
hazard will be counteracted if either one or both controls succeed: 
 
( ) ( iki XPXXS =, succeeds, or kX succeeds, or both succeed ) 
 
The hazard will not be counteracted if both controls fail: 
 
( ) ( iki XPXXF =, fails and kX fails ). 
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Thus, ( ) ( ).,1, kiki XXFXXS −=  
 
Assuming that ( )iXF  is independent of ( )kXF  yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ].1111, kikiki XSXSXFXFXXS −−−=−=  
 
Net effectiveness (NE) is the combined effectiveness of all controls which 
counteract a hazard.  This, the net effectiveness of a pair of controls iX  and kX , for a 
hazard jZ , can be defined as: 
 
NE ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ].,1,11,, jkjijki ZXEZXEZXX −−−=    (1) 
 
Generalizing to a set of s controls that counteract the same hazard, jZ , this analysis can 
be extended to yield: 
 




( )[ ]ji ZXE .1−      (2) 
 
Where { }.,,1 siXX i K==  
 
This model assumes the independence of the effectiveness of different controls.  
Practically speaking, this means that failure of one control to counteract a hazard is 
associated with neither an increase nor a decrease in the likelihood that a second control 
will counteract the hazard.  This assumption is valid in most cases.  For example, if both 
password identification and encryption are being used to prevent unauthorized access to 
data, the fact that a perpetrator has obtained a password does not necessarily mean that he 
can decrypt the data.  The fact that a limit check on a value has failed does not imply that 
a control total will also fail.  Sometimes, however, failure of one control can be related to 
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failure of another.  A natural disaster, for example, may result in the destruction of a 
database together will all backups, transaction logs, and audit trails.  In general, however, 
independence is a reasonable assumption and greatly reduces model complexity. 
The preceding analysis assumed that a set of controls is successful if at least one 
control is successful.  This is an appropriate assumption if all controls are preventive.  
Additional analysis is necessary when detective and corrective controls are introduced.  A 
detective control signals the occurrence of a hazard, but does nothing to counteract it 
(Hall and Singleton, 2005).  A corrective control must be applied to counteract the 
detected hazard.  To see this, consider the following example.  Comparing a "total" 
generated during on-line transaction processing with one generated manually is called a 
"control total" and can be used to detect data entry errors.  A control total is an example 
of a detective control.  An associated corrective control might involve reviewing the data 
entered to determine where the error was made and correcting it by re-entering the data.  
Thus, for the hazard to be counteracted, both the detective and corrective control must be 
successfully applied. 
Let dX  be a detective control and cX  be a corrective control.  (Again, for 
convenience, we have temporarily dropped the notation related to the hazard, jZ .)  The 
probability model for success in this case is then: 
 
( ) ( dcd XPXXS =, succeeds and cX  succeeds ). 
 
If we assume the independence of the probability of success of dX  and cX  then: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )., cdcd XSXSXXS =  
 
If dX  and cX  counteract jZ  then: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).,,, jcjdcdcd ZXEZXEXSXSXXS ==     (3) 
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Now further suppose that a preventive control, pX  also counteracts jZ  and is 
independent of the combination of dX  and cX .  The combined effectiveness of the three 
controls pX , dX , and cX  can be calculated, Using Eqs. (2) and (4), to be: 
 
NE ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]jpjcjdj ZXEZXEZXEZX ,1,,11, −−==    (4) 
 
where { }.,, pcd XXXX = .  Other controls can be added in a similar manner. 
 
While the complexity of expression (4) grows rapidly as the number of controls 
increases, it is still feasible to define and evaluate such an expression, given a particular 
hazard and a single set of controls.  The control selection problem addressed in this 
paper, however, is actually more complex.  Given a particular hazard, and N potential 
controls to counteract it, then there exist 2 N  possible combinations of controls, each of 
which yields the complex evaluation expression (4).  The computations required to select 
the best combination of controls for a single hazard grows exponentially with the number 
of controls.  Therefore, the selection of the optimal set of controls for a given set of 
hazards for problems of real world size is computationally complex and costly. 
Equation (1) is multiplicative in (1-E).  Similarly, Eq. (3) is multiplicative in E.  
Equation (4), however, is more complex than either (1) or (3).  A simplifying assumption, 
that at least one corrective control is always used whenever a detective control is applied, 
allows Eq. (4) to be expressed in the form of Eq. (1).  Since it makes little sense to spend 
money to detect a hazard if nothing is going to be done to correct it (once it has been 
detected), then the above simplifying assumption is basically realistic.  A possible 
drawback of this simplification is that there may be more than one possible corrective 
control that may be chosen to be combined with a detective control.  When this case 
arises, each corrective control can be combined with the detective control to form a 
combination that becomes one of the alternatives to be evaluated.  This assumption 
allows a detective-corrective control combination to be considered as a single unit that 
behaves mathematically like a preventive control in Eq. (1). 
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Transforming the problem from Eq. (4) to Eq. (1) is especially advisable when 
problems are large.  Anyone attempting to solve Eq. (4) will face a nonlinear equation 
whose optimization will take a great deal of time even with today's computing 
technologies.  Equation (1), which is also non-linear, is more readily solved. 
Cost is the second important attribute of a control.  Control cost ( )iXC  is the 
present value of the cost of developing and operating a control, iX .  Total control cost 









iXC          (5) 
 
Now that we have formulated the effectiveness and cost components of the 
model, we return to the element of risk presented earlier.  Let ( )jZR  be the anticipated 
monetary loss associated with the occurrence of a hazard jZ  when no controls are used. 
If in a given context there exist q hazards, the total uncontrolled risk (TUR) is the sum of 









         (6) 
  
We will relate the notion of uncontrolled risk (R) to that of net effectiveness (NE) 
be defining a new concept called residual risk (RR) for a hazard jZ  that is measured in 
monetary units and defined as: 
 
RR ( ) ( ) ( )[ ].,1 jjj ZXNEZRZ −=        (7) 
 
Note that the independence of hazard occurrence and control effectiveness 
mentioned earlier is implicit in Equation (7). 
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RR ( )jZ          (8) 
 
 A summary measure of the extent to which an IS achieves its dependability 
objectives is the dependability quotient (DQ) defined as: 
DQ= (TUR- TRR)/TUR.        (9) 
In Eq. (9), DQ = 1 when total residual risk, TRR, is 0.  This case would arise 
when a set of controls counteracted all hazards, making the IS completely dependable.  
Conversely, DQ = 0 implies that the total uncontrolled risk, TUR, is equal to TRR.  This 
case would arise when no hazards were counteracted.  Since most IS would include one 
or more controls but would not counteract all hazards, DQ would normally be greater 
than zero but less than one.  The more dependable a system, the closer its dependability 
quotient is to one.  
The total cost, TC, of the control system for an IS is then: 













i ZXEZRXC    (10) 















i ERC        (11)  
